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Cheap Talk Reconsidered:  New Evidence from CVM* 
 
 
 
Abstract.  Two recent studies have shown that “cheap talk” is an effective means of eliminating 
positive hypothetical bias in experimental and field-auction settings.  We further investigate the 
ability of cheap talk to mitigate positive hypothetical bias in a contingent-valuation phone survey 
administered to over 4,000 households.  Positive hypothetical bias is detected in our data by 
contrasting revealed and stated preference information.  However, a short, neutral cheap-talk 
script appears to exacerbate rather than mitigate the bias.  Based on this and mixed evidence 
from earlier studies, we suggest caution in using cheap talk as an ex ante control for hypothetical 
bias.   
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1. Introduction 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is a widely used approach for estimating the value 
of goods and services when market information on equilibrium prices and quantities is either 
unavailable or unreliable.  CVM has been employed by courts and government agencies such as 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to assess the benefits of policies 
impacting the environment and damages from environmental disasters.  Researchers often 
estimate these values through surveys that ask individuals to place a monetary value on the 
hypothetical provision of a good or service.  Since provision of the good and the associated 
payment are purely hypothetical, the reliability and validity of information obtained from CVM 
has been the subject of lively debate (Diamond and Hausman 1994, Hanneman 1994).  
Proponents of CVM have attempted to develop new methodologies that either (1) mitigate ex 
ante any hypothetical bias (i.e., bias associated with the respondent misstating her maximum 
willingness to pay (WTP) due to the hypothetical nature of the good and payment method), or (2) 
calibrate the welfare estimates ex post (List and Shogren 1998, Harrison et al. 1999).                
Recently, Cummings and Taylor (1999) and List (2001) have advocated the use of “cheap 
talk” to mitigate ex ante the effects of hypothetical bias in CVM.  In the context of CVM, cheap 
talk refers to explicit warnings about the problem of hypothetical bias provided prior to 
respondents’ valuation of the good.  Cummings and Taylor (CT hereafter), in a series of lab 
experiments with students, find that cheap talk successfully eliminates hypothetical bias in 
valuation responses for a variety of public goods.  List tests a similar script for private goods 
using sportscard auctions and finds that cheap talk is effective in eliminating hypothetical bias 
for non-dealers, but not for dealers.  The cheap-talk scripts used in both of these studies are 
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almost identical in length and content.  They each provide lengthy descriptions of positive 
hypothetical bias. 
In order for cheap talk (such as that applied by CT and List) to be a useful design element in 
CVM surveys, the script needs to be general so that, unlike ex post calibration, it can be easily 
applied across a wide array of non-market goods without requiring ex ante information on the 
degree of hypothetical bias in the data.  Unfortunately, the scripts used in CT and List are not 
easily generalized.1  Both scripts refer to a baseline degree of hypothetical bias by comparing the 
outcomes of preliminary experiments with hypothetical and real payment mechanisms for the 
goods in question.  In CVM research, such prior information regarding the degree of hypothetical 
bias is typically unavailable or too expensive to produce in the field.  The researcher must 
therefore presume the degree of hypothetical bias that exists in the population and subsequently 
calibrate the specific wording of his cheap-talk script based solely on this presumption.  The 
more unique the population or good in question, the more potentially problematic is this 
calibration-by-presumption approach. 
Our research addresses this concern by testing a more “neutral” version of cheap talk that can 
easily be generalized to other goods or services.  We administered a telephone survey to over 
4,000 households regarding their WTP for a curbside recycling program (CRP).  Unlike the pure 
public goods used in the CT experiments and the private good in List’s field auctions, curbside 
recycling can be considered an impure public good because it provides both potential private 
benefits (in the forms of added convenience relative to dropoff recycling, reduced garbage fees, 
and a “warm glow” from helping the environment), and public benefits by reducing the stream of 
                                                
1In addition to their main script, CT report similar results using a modified script that replaces the specific 
percentages of people in previous studies who voted “yes” for hypothetical and real referenda, with a statement 
indicating that “on average” more people voted “yes” for hypothetical referenda (see CT, pages 659-660).  Although 
the modified script is more general in the sense of not reporting the magnitude of hypothetical bias, it still informs 
the subjects that the bias is positive. 
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waste going to landfills (Andreoni 1990).  As part of our survey design, we randomly assign our 
sample into three groups; the first receiving no cheap talk, the second receiving a short-script 
version of cheap talk, and the third receiving cheap talk with a reminder of budget constraints 
and substitutes.  Aside from using a shorter script (to be compatible with phone surveys), the 
primary difference between our cheap-talk scripts and those used by CT and List is the manner in 
which hypothetical bias is described to the survey respondents.  While CT and List state that 
hypothetical bias leads people to overstate their true WTP, the cheap-talk scripts in our survey 
are purposefully neutral.  Instead, they inform respondents that hypothetical bias leads people to 
misstate their true WTP. 
We crafted neutral cheap-talk statements for two reasons.   First, we wished to avoid 
criticisms that we are simply “layering” on another type of bias, one that may be independent of 
the observed hypothetical bias itself.2  Second, although most research suggests that hypothetical 
bias is positive (e.g., Arrow et al. 1993, Hannemann 1994, and Diamond and Hausman 1994), 
this is not always the case (Dickie et al. 1987, Adamowicz et al. 1994, Carson et al. 1996, Nestor 
1998, and Haab et al. 1999).  As a result, researchers cannot be certain ex ante whether 
hypothetical bias will be positive or negative in their population, much less know its magnitude.  
Unlike CT and List, we had little evidence regarding the direction and magnitude of hypothetical 
bias for our population or the good in question.  Therefore, we decided to err on the side of 
caution so as not to induce any additional bias.  Much to our surprise, this seemingly innocuous 
change in verbiage from a directed to a neutral script caused respondents receiving cheap talk to 
state higher WTP than those not receiving cheap talk.   
                                                
2 This hypothesis of a “layering effect” is refuted by CT for one of their sub-groups.  However, we feel that it is still 
an open question, particularly for CVM surveys. 
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This counterintuitive result is robust across models, types of households, and types of 
recycling programs.  Moreover, the result is in sharp contrast to our earlier study of household 
recycling behavior in Utah, where we found that a similar short-script version of cheap talk with 
directed rather than neutral wording caused households to state lower WTP on average (Aadland 
and Caplan 2003).  That study was based on the same type of good, the same assumptions 
concerning the household’s underlying preference structure, the same empirical approach, 
similar sets of explanatory variables, and a sample from within the population used for this 
study.  Because of the “procedural invariance” between the two studies (Kahneman and Tversky 
1984) and as a result of the studies’ distinctive findings, we are led to question the efficacy of 
cheap-talk statements in mitigating hypothetical bias in CVM surveys.3   
The next section provides examples of the cheap-talk designs used in previous studies.  In 
Section 3, we briefly describe the survey and cheap-talk scripts used in our study.  Section 4 
reports our empirical evidence on hypothetical bias and cheap talk.  Section 5 summarizes our 
overall findings.          
 
2. Previous Use of Cheap Talk 
CT are the first to use the game-theoretic terminology “cheap talk” in the context of CVM.  
Cheap talk differs from standard reminder statements about substitutes and budget constraints in 
that the script explicitly warns respondents about the potential problem of hypothetical bias.  
Loomis et al. (1994) and Neil (1995) find that short-scripted reminder statements (without cheap 
talk) are ineffective in altering respondents’ stated WTP for a public good in a hypothetical 
setting.  However, CT find that a cheap-talk script openly discussing the existence of positive 
                                                
3 Several studies touch on the importance of specific wording or instrument calibration effects, as in Harrison 
(2002). 
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hypothetical bias prior to voting on public good referenda eliminates the bias in an experimental 
setting, in the sense that the results from the cheap-talk and actual referenda are statistically 
indistinguishable.4  An excerpt from CT’s cheap-talk script is given below: 
 ... in a recent study, several different groups of people voted on a referendum just 
like the one you are about to vote on.  Payment was hypothetical for these groups, as it 
will be for you.  No one had to pay money if the referendum passed.  The results of 
these studies were that on average 38 percent of them voted “yes”.  With another set of 
groups with similar people voting on the same referendum as you will vote on here, but 
where payment was real and people really did have to pay money if the referendum 
passed, the results on average across the groups were that 25 percent voted yes.  That’s 
quite a difference, isn’t it? 
 We call this a “hypothetical bias.”  Hypothetical bias is the difference that we 
continually see in the way people respond to hypothetical referenda as compared to 
real referenda…  
  
List reads a nearly identical cheap-talk script to market participants in a field auction for 
sportscards.  He finds that cheap-talk statements are effective in eliminating hypothetical bias, 
but only for ordinary consumers (i.e., non-dealers).  Dealers, who presumably have more market 
experience in valuing sportscards, are not influenced by cheap talk.  Similarly, Brown et al. 
(2003) report that CT’s cheap talk script is effective at high referendum bid levels but ineffective 
at low bid levels.   
Poe et al. (2002) find that the following short script, 
I have one caution though.  For programs like this it’s often the case that more 
people say they would sign up than actually do sign-up.  Utilities in other parts of the 
country have found that eight times as many people say yes to similar programs as 
actually take part in them.  With this in mind… 
 
does not have a statistically significant effect on the participation decisions of individuals 
valuing green power and tree planting in New York via a provision-point mechanism CVM 
                                                
4 Two other studies, Loomis et al. (1996) using a short script somewhere between a reminder statement and cheap 
talk and Murphy et al. (2003) using CT’s cheap talk script, find that while these statements do not eliminate 
hypothetical bias, they do reduce it. 
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survey.  Aadland and Caplan (2003) also employ a shorter version of cheap talk than CT and 
List.  Similar to List, they find that the effectiveness of cheap talk varies by type of household.  
In particular, those households who might be expected to suffer the most from positive 
hypothetical bias (e.g. those motivated to recycle by an ethical duty or who are members of an 
environmental organization) also tend to lower their stated WTP the most in response to cheap 
talk.  Their cheap-talk script reads, 
... studies have shown that many people say they are willing to pay more for 
curbside recycling than they actually will pay when it becomes available in their 
community.  For this reason, as I read the next two curbside recycling fees, please 
imagine your household actually paying them.       
 
To our knowledge, this is the first evidence that short cheap-talk scripts can be effective in 
mitigating positive hypothetical bias in CVM surveys.5 
 
3. Cheap-Talk and Survey Design 
During the winter of 2002, we conducted a telephone survey about recycling behavior to over 
4,000 households in 40 western U.S. cities with populations over 50,000.6  After the surveys 
were completed, the households were divided into two main groups.  One group (henceforth 
“CRP-H households”) includes households who either do not have a CRP in their community or 
who reside in a community with a CRP but are unaware of its existence.  For this group, we 
described the following hypothetical CRP: 
                                                
5 Two working papers also deserve mention.  First, Cummings et al. (1995) find that while “heavy” cheap talk tends 
to offset positive hypothetical bias, “light” cheap talk actually tends to increase the upward bias in a public good 
valuation experiment.  Second, Bulte et al. (2003), in a field study using “netbox” technology (which enables 
respondents to retrieve and return questionnaires via a television set) find that a shortened version of cheap talk is 
effective in mitigating positive bias.  We note, however, that the light and shortened scripts of Cummings et al. and 
Bulte et al. are still much longer than those used by Poe et al. (2002) and Aadland and Caplan (2003). 
6 The survey was administered by the survey research laboratory at Washington State University.  A list of the 40 
cities included in our sample and the survey instrument are available at www.uwyo.edu/aadland/research/recycle/. 
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     At the beginning of the survey, you said that your community does not currently 
have a curbside recycling service.  For the next few questions, please imagine that you 
COULD have a service that regularly collects aluminum cans, cardboard, glass, paper, 
plastic and tin cans.  Your household (would/would not) need to sort your recyclables 
into separate bins and pay a fee for the recycling service, in addition to your current 
monthly garbage collection fee.  Now we are going to ask you some questions about 
your household's willingness to pay for this type of curbside recycling service. 
 
The second group (henceforth “CRP-A households”) includes households residing in 
communities with an actual CRP and who know of its existence. These households were asked 
hypothetical questions regarding their WTP for their community’s existing program, regardless 
of whether they actually participate in it.7  Because they reside in communities with mandatory 
or voluntary CRPs, we further divided the CRP-A households into two sub-groups.8  CRP-A 
households residing in communities with a voluntary CRP are assigned to the CRP-V sub-group, 
while those residing in communities with a mandatory CRP are assigned to the CRP-M sub-
group.  
We then randomly assigned all respondents (i.e., all CRP-H and CRP-A households) with 
equal probability to one of three cheap-talk groups.  The first group received no cheap-talk 
statement and proceeded directly to the valuation questions.  The second group received the 
following short cheap-talk script, which was read prior to the ensuing WTP question:  
   As you prepare to answer the next few questions, please keep in mind that in 
previous surveys we have found that the amounts that people SAY they are willing to 
pay for curbside recycling are sometimes different from the amounts that they would 
ACTUALLY be willing to pay when curbside recycling became available in their 
community. For this reason, as I read the following curbside recycling fees, please 
imagine your household is ACTUALLY paying them. 
 
                                                
7 This presumes that non-participating CRP-A households are not only aware of the CRP’s existence, but are also 
familiar with the program’s main attributes (e.g., such as those mentioned in the hypothetical description) via 
observing their neighbors who do recycle or through occasional exposure in their local media. 
8 By “voluntary” we mean that the household pays for the program only if it has signed up for it. “Mandatory” 
means that the household pays for the program regardless of whether it has signed up for it. 
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This cheap-talk script is substantially shorter than that used by CT and List (so as to be 
compatible with a phone survey) and intentionally does not take a stand regarding the direction 
of hypothetical bias.  The third group of households received the following “long” cheap-talk 
script, which added explicit reminders to the household about budget constraints and alternatives 
to recycling: 
As you prepare to answer the next few questions, please keep in mind the following 
three things.  First, keep in mind your household budget.  In a typical month, at what 
price would your household be able to afford curbside recycling?  Second, keep in mind 
that there are alternatives to curbside recycling such as recycling drop-off centers and 
landfills.  And third, keep in mind that in previous surveys we have found that the 
amounts that people SAY they are willing to pay for curbside recycling are sometimes 
different from the amounts that they would ACTUALLY be willing to pay when curbside 
recycling became available in their community. For this reason, as I read the following 
curbside recycling fees, please imagine your household is ACTUALLY paying them. 
 
Our decision to test variations in script length and reminders about budget constraints and 
substitutes is motivated by mixed results in the literature.  As mentioned above, CT find that 
long-scripted cheap talk is effective in an experimental setting.  List finds that similar long-
scripted cheap talk is effective in field auctions for dealers but ineffective for non-dealers.  
Brown et al. find that the effectiveness of long cheap talk depends upon the bid level. Similar to 
List, Aadland and Caplan (2003) find that a short-scripted version of cheap talk is effective only 
for certain types of households.  Poe et al. report that short-scripted cheap talk is ineffective in 
eliminating hypothetical bias.  Loomis et al. (1994) and Neil find that reminders about budget 
constraints and substitutes are also ineffective.  In sum, the evidence regarding the effectiveness 
of various cheap-talk and reminder statements is anything but clear.   
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4. Empirical Results 
 In this section, we report three sets of empirical results.  The first set documents the existence 
of positive hypothetical bias in our data.  That is, we find that CRP-H households are, all else 
equal, more likely to (state that they will) participate in a CRP than the CRP-V households.9  The 
second set of results documents the unconditional effects of cheap-talk scripts on household 
yes/no responses to randomized opening bid values (which effectively determine their 
hypothetical participation rates).  Here, we simply contrast the responses of all households who 
received a cheap-talk script with those households that were not subjected to cheap talk.10  The 
advantage of examining the unconditional participation rates is that they are transparent and are 
not dependent on any particular econometric model.  Finally, our third set of results provides 
conditional evidence on the effects of our cheap-talk scripts.  We report the coefficient estimates 
associated with cheap-talk dummy variables from an econometric model where we control for a 
plethora of potential differences across treatments, groups, and household demographics (see the 
Appendix for definitions of the control variables).  
 
4.1 Estimates of Hypothetical Bias 
 We begin by documenting the existence of positive hypothetical bias in our CVM responses.  
Toward this end, we compare the (hypothetical) participation decisions of CRP-H households 
with the (actual) participation decisions of CRP-V households.  Our survey was designed to 
facilitate such a comparison by choosing appropriate opening bid values and describing 
                                                
9 Only CRP-V households are able to reveal their true preferences and thus provide a benchmark for determining the 
degree of hypothetical bias in the CRP-H households’ responses. 
10 Recall that all households in our sample received a hypothetical WTP question; for CRP-H households the WTP 
question pertained to a hypothetical CRP while for CRP-A households the question referred to their existing CRP. 
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hypothetical CRPs that are similar to existing voluntary programs in our sample.11   To detect 
hypothetical bias we pool CRP-V households and CRP-H households who have valued 
hypothetical CRPs with attributes similar to the existing voluntary programs valued by CRP-V 
households.12  We then estimate a single-bounded probit model (with known thresholds) for the 
decision of whether to participate in a CRP, while controlling for a host of demographic, 
program, and community attributes such as age, education, income, employment status, 
motivation for recycling, degree of sorting required for CRP, availability and use of substitutes to 
recycling, and so on.  
 Our null hypothesis of no hypothetical bias is tested by observing the statistical significance 
of the coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the participation decision is hypothetical 
(i.e., based on the CRP-H household’s valuation of the hypothetical program) or real (i.e., based 
on the CRP-V household’s actual decision of whether to participate in its community’s CRP).13  
If we find that there is no statistical difference between the participation rates of these two 
groups of households then, all else equal, we conclude that hypothetical bias is unlikely to be a 
problem in our population.  If instead the coefficient on the hypothetical dummy variable is 
positive and statistically significant, we conclude that positive hypothetical bias is likely to exist, 
and its average level is measured by the value of the coefficient.       
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
                                                
11 Since households in our sample are spread across 40 western U.S. cities, we adjust CRP fees and income levels 
for differences in costs of living using the city comparison calculator at http://list.realestate.yahoo.com/re/neighbor/.  
12 More precisely, our pooled dataset is created by first including all CRP-V households that have effectively 
revealed their preferences via the decision of whether to participate in their community’s voluntary CRP.  The 
voluntary CRPs vary in terms of their monthly cost-of-living-adjusted fees (which are roughly between $1 and $5 
per month) and whether they require sorting of the recyclables.  Second, we include all CRP-H households (that 
valued hypothetical sorting and non-sorting CRPs) with random opening bids that were within the $1 to $5 interval.  
Although our WTP questions were set in a double-bounded, dichotomous-choice format (discussed in further detail 
below), we consider solely the opening bids for this exercise so that the design of the hypothetical decision mimics 
actual decisions as closely as possible.  The pooled dataset contains 1,782 households – 994 CRP-V households (i.e., 
revealed-preference households) and 788 CRP-H households (i.e., stated-preference households).     
13 See List et al. (2004) and Carson et al. (2002) for two recent studies that measure how the degree of “social 
isolation” and “consequentialism,” respectively, influence respondents’ “real” responses in laboratory experiments. 
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 The estimation results are shown in Table 1.  The signs and significance levels of the 
demographic, program- and community-specific variables are similar to the results in Aadland 
and Caplan.  We therefore focus on the result germane to this section; the sign and magnitude of 
the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the participation decision was 
hypothetical (CRP-H HOUSEHOLD).  The coefficient is statistically significant and indicates 
that, all else equal, CRP-H households stated a WTP that is, on average, $2.76 more than CRP-V 
households.  Stated in terms of likelihood of participation, the CRP-H households are 7.7 percent 
more likely to participate than CRP-V households.  This suggests that positive hypothetical bias 
is present in our data. 
 
4.2 Unconditional Cheap-Talk Effects 
 Does cheap talk mitigate the positive hypothetical bias in our data?  In Table 2 we report 
average rates of hypothetical participation across opening bid levels, cheap-talk scripts, and types 
of CRP (actual or hypothetical).  It is important to note that unlike the analysis in the previous 
section we are not interested in the actual participation decisions of CRP-V households.  Instead, 
we focus on how cheap talk influences the stated participation decisions of both CRP-H and 
CRP-A households. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 Before discussing the effects of cheap talk, notice that, as expected, hypothetical 
participation rates (and, by implication, WTP) generally decline as the bid levels increase.  More 
importantly, however, Table 2 indicates that respondents who were read either short or long 
cheap-talk scripts often stated they would participate at statistically different rates than those 
who did not receive cheap talk.  The surprising result is not that cheap talk affects hypothetical 
 14 
participation decisions for curbside recycling, but rather that it is typically associated with higher 
rates of hypothetical participation.  Furthermore, the strongest positive effect is for CRP-A 
households and households receiving the longer cheap-talk script with a reminder about 
substitutes and budget constraints.  Thus, from the results in Table 2, it is clear that there is 
absolutely no evidence that cheap talk (either with or without a reminder about substitutes and 
budget constraints) is effective in mitigating the positive hypothetical bias known to exist in our 
data.  To the contrary, cheap talk appears to exacerbate the bias!       
 We now offer a few potential explanations for this counterintuitive result.  To begin, it could 
be argued that by including the word “landfills” in our long-script version we unwittingly created 
an environmental “flashpoint,” triggering images of overflowing garbage dumps in the minds of 
respondents who then reacted by inflating their WTP responses.  The problem with this 
hypothesis, however, is that it cannot completely explain our results.  CRP-A households that 
receive short-scripted cheap talk (without the landfill reference) also tend to be more likely to 
participate (see Table 2) and, as we will see in Section 4.3, are more likely to state conditionally 
higher values than those not receiving any cheap talk. 
 A second possible explanation, provided by Cummings et al., is that cheap talk “might assure 
those doubting the hypothetical nature of the experiment that it is indeed hypothetical” and as a 
result encourages positive hypothetical bias.  The difficulty with this explanation is in 
understanding why additional positive bias is elicited from some scripts but not others.  A third 
possibility is that when they hear a neutral cheap-talk script stating that respondents’ WTP 
responses “are sometimes different” as opposed to “are sometimes higher” than their actual 
WTP, survey respondents may be induced to rely more heavily on their own heuristics and 
inferences in an attempt to guess what type of bias the researchers have in mind.  If this 
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hypothesis is true, our results indicate that respondents may be guessing that we would expect 
them to correct this bias by stating higher WTP values.14   
 Each of these hypotheses and our empirical results suggest that we simply do not understand 
how the human cognitive process receives and then reacts to signals such as cheap talk.  Several 
theories of how human cognition reacts to signals are discussed in Fischhoff (2002).  As 
Fischhoff (in press) points out, artifacts (such as unexpected responses to cheap talk) could 
emanate from “the subtle ways that interviewers communicate their expectations.”  He (in press) 
also notes that “elicitation is a reactive measurement procedure...The process assumes that 
people sometimes need help, in order to understand what they believe and want.  That help may 
include presenting a balanced selection of opinions, lest clients miss a critical perspective just 
because it did not occur to them at the time.”  It is possible that in erring on the side of 
conciseness, our short but balanced cheap-talk script provided insufficient detail regarding 
“selection of opinions,” resulting in unpredictable effects on WTP. 
 As a final note, we acknowledge that our counterintuitive cheap-talk results could simply be 
due to systematic differences in the treatment and control groups.  This seems unlikely, however, 
as the cheap-talk scripts were assigned randomly across such a large number of households and 
communities.  Nevertheless, for the sake of thoroughness, we now turn to a conditional analysis 
of cheap talk’s effects.      
 
4.3 Conditional Cheap-Talk Effects   
 Our conditional estimates are based on the double-bounded, dichotomous-choice (DBDC) 
model first introduced by Carson et al. (1986).  We use maximum likelihood to estimate a model 
                                                
14 Alternatively, respondents may be reacting to what they believe the university-sponsored interviewer wants to 
hear, thus creating a “social-desirability bias” in favor of curbside recycling.  We thank John Loomis for this insight. 
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that incorporates the responses to both the opening and follow-up bids.  As in the participation 
probit model in Section 4.1, we control for a number of demographic and community 
attributes.15  Based on our earlier work and List, we also estimate models that allow for 
differential cheap-talk effects across household characteristics.  
 WTP questions set in the DBDC format elicit a household’s WTP through a sequence of yes-
or-no valuation questions.  The first question is:  “Would you be willing to pay $τ for the 
service?”  The opening bid τ is chosen randomly from the integers $2 through $10, based on the 
range of actual household fees in our sub-sample of communities with an existing CRP.  Based 
on her response to the opening bid, the respondent is then asked a similar follow-up question, but 
with a larger bid, τH = 2τ, if she answered “yes” (i.e., willing to pay at least τ for the service) or a 
smaller bid τL = 0.5τ if she answered “no” (i.e., unwilling to pay τ for the service).  Those who 
answer “no” to the first two questions are then asked whether they would participate in a 
program that is free of charge.  Based on the responses to the opening bid and follow-up 
questions, the respondent’s latent WTP may therefore be placed in one of five regions:  (-∞,0), 
[0,τL), [τL,τ), [τ,τH) or [τH, ∞). 
 There is a growing literature concerned with incentive incompatibility issues arising from use 
of the DBDC format (c.f., Alberini et al. 1997, Carson et al. 2000, Cameron et al. 2002, and 
DeShazo 2002).  Recently, Aadland and Caplan (2004) have proposed a modified version of 
Whitehead’s (2002) random-effects probit model to test and control for both starting-point bias 
and incentive incompatibility in iterative-question formats.  When applied to our data, the 
modified random-effects model indicates the existence of starting-point bias and a small amount 
of incentive incompatibility.  However, the mean WTP estimates for the two models (one 
                                                
15 The estimated coefficients on these control variables are generally similar in sign and significance to the results in 
Table 1, and therefore are omitted. 
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controlling for starting-point bias and incentive incompatibility and one not) are very similar.  As 
a result, we report the results from the latter model.16 
 We posit that a household’s true WTP (WTP*) is represented by the equation   
 i i iWTP* X= β+ε ,                             (1) 
where Xi is a row vector of household-, program-, and community-specific control variables, β is 
a corresponding column vector of coefficients, and εi is a normally distributed error term for 
households i = 1,…,n.  We also allow for possible heteroscedasticity by modeling the variance of 
the WTP error term as  
 2i i i(Z ) exp(Z )σ γ = γ ,                (2) 
where Zi is a row vector of variables related to the disturbance variances and γ is a column vector 
of parameters.   
 The results from this exercise are reported in Table 3.  The first row of Table 3 shows the 
effect of short and long cheap talk across all CPR-H and CRP-A households.  The remaining 
rows report the results of the two cheap-talk scripts interacted with certain demographic groups.  
Consistent with the unconditional cheap-talk results in the previous section, all of the coefficients 
are either positive or not statistically different from zero.  Overall, survey respondents are more 
sensitive to cheap talk when they are valuing an actual CRP and when cheap talk is accompanied 
by a reminder about substitutes and budget constraints.17     
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Furthermore, CRP-A households with at least one member holding a Ph.D. or equivalent 
professional degree and who received short (long)-scripted cheap talk are, all else equal, willing 
to pay approximately $1.07 (1.38) more per month for an actual CRP than their counterparts who 
                                                
16 The results from the former model are available from the authors upon request. 
17 Consistent with Bulte et al., we also find no evidence that cheap talk is related to the variance of the errors. 
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did not receive short (long)-scripted cheap talk.  Similarly, respondents who belong to an 
environmental organization and who received the short script are willing to pay an additional 
$1.54 per month, on average, while those who received the long script are only willing to pay an 
additional $1.45 per month.  In sum, our results indicate that cheap-talk statements may be 
ineffective or even counter-productive in mitigating hypothetical bias, with the degree of the 
problem varying across types of households. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The evidence from our CVM survey draws into question the efficacy of cheap talk as a 
reliable and robust ex ante correction mechanism for positive hypothetical bias.  Although initial 
research has shown that a long-scripted version of cheap talk can be effective in eliminating this 
bias in lab experiments and field auctions, shorter and more neutrally worded scripts 
appropriately tailored for phone interviews have clearly demonstrated a high degree of sensitivity 
to script length and content.  Indeed, we first establish the existence of positive hypothetical bias 
in our data by contrasting revealed- and stated-preference information, but then find that our 
neutral cheap-talk scripts actually exacerbate the problem.  Moreover, the degree of exacerbation 
seems to increase with script length and with respect to household characteristics (e.g., 
education, environmental advocacy, etc.) that are likely to be systematically related to the degree 
of observed hypothetical bias.  Because WTP responses are so sensitive to script length and 
content, CVM practitioners should use caution in relying on cheap-talk statements to mitigate 
hypothetical bias. 
 A potential criticism of our cheap-talk design is that we did not a priori establish a baseline 
degree of hypothetical bias in our data.  Had we known the extent of positive hypothetical bias in 
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our data beforehand, we could have chosen a script informing respondents of the direction and 
(possibly the magnitude) of the bias, rather than using a neutral script.  CT, List, and Aadland 
and Caplan (2003) report some success with these types of directed scripts.  However, the 
primary attraction of cheap talk as an ex ante control for hypothetical bias is its apparent 
generalizability (in the form of a standard script) to CVM studies across a wide array of non-
market goods and services.  Our findings suggest that standardized cheap-talk scripts can 
produce undesirable results.  As a result, we feel caution is warranted in using cheap talk to 
correct for hypothetical bias until we better understand how the length and content of cheap talk 
statements influence the cognitive processes of survey respondents. 
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Appendix 
Explanatory Variables Description 
Ethical Duty Do you feel an ethical duty to recycle to help the environment?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Monetary 
Are you motivated to recycle in order to save money?  For example, are 
you able to use a smaller garbage container because you recycle or you 
get money for your aluminum cans?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Primarily Ethics 
Which one would most encourage your household to recycle: an ethical 
duty to help the environment, or saving money?   
1 = ethical duty, 0 = save money. 
Dropoff Distance Distance in miles to the nearest dropoff site. 
Dropoff User 
For households that have used dropoff facilities in the last 12 months, 
how often do you take recyclable materials to the dropoff center?   
1 = always or often, 0 = sometimes or rarely.  
Young 1 if 18<Age<35, 0 otherwise. 
Old 1 if 65<Age, 0 otherwise. 
Male 1 = male, 0 = female. 
High School What is the highest level of education attained by any member of your household?  1 = high school graduate, 0 = otherwise 
Associates 1 = associates degree, 0 = otherwise 
Bachelors 1 = bachelors degree, 0 = otherwise 
Masters 1 = masters degree, 0 = otherwise 
Ph.D. 1 = Ph.D. or equivalent professional degree, 0 = otherwise 
Household Size Number of adults currently living in the household who are older than 18 years of age, other than the respondent. 
Environmental  
Organization  
Does anyone in your household belong to an environmental club, 
group, or organization?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Med Income 1 if $35K/yr<Household Income<$75K/yr, 0 otherwise 
High Income 1 if Household Income>$75K/yr, 0 otherwise 
Employed Is the adult with the highest income currently working for pay, either full time or part time?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Retired Is the adult with the highest income currently retired?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Short Cheap Talk 1 = received short cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise. 
Longer Cheap Talk 1 = received longer cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise. 
Sorting Required 1 = CRP requires some sorting of recyclable materials, 0 otherwise. 
Polite 1 if polite initial refusal, 0 otherwise. 
Angry 1 if angry initial refusal, 0 otherwise. 
Certainty 1 = certainty of response to the last WTP question ≥ 90%, 0 otherwise 
Landfill Visit Has anyone in your household ever visited your community’s landfill?    1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Landfill Distance Distance to nearest landfill in miles. 
Landfill Distance Spline Max{Landfill Distance – 2, 0}. 
CRP-H Household 1 = hypothetical CRP household, 0 = otherwise. 
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Table 1. Single-Bounded Probit Model for CRP Participation  
Explanatory Variables 
Estimates Summary Statistics 
Coefficient P –Value N Mean Std. Dev. 
Ethical Duty 4.451*** 0.000 1759 0.869 0.340 
Monetary -2.579*** 0.000 1757 0.484 0.500 
Primarily Ethics 1.564*** 0.005 753 0.578 0.494 
Dropoff Distance 0.082* 0.096 1248 3.843 3.557 
Dropoff User -0.630 0.120 842 0.618 0.237 
Young 1.044** 0.011 1715 0.283 0.451 
Old -1.386** 0.034 1715 0.118 0.323 
Male -0.144 0.343 1768 0.386 0.487 
High School 1.322 0.130 1755 0.133 0.338 
Some College 1.184 0.153 1755 0.165 0.372 
Associates 1.784* 0.075 1755 0.102 0.303 
Bachelors 2.193** 0.032 1755 0.308 0.462 
Masters 2.672** 0.017 1755 0.189 0.391 
Ph.D. 2.508** 0.030 1755 0.079 0.270 
Household Size 0.016 0.466 1761 1.109 0.922 
Environmental Organization  1.747*** 0.007 1744 0.094 0.292 
Med Income -0.026 0.480 1563 0.406 0.491 
High Income 0.245 0.330 1563 0.364 0.481 
Employed 0.827 0.140 1748 0.815 0.389 
Retired 1.452* 0.068 1733 0.124 0.329 
Short Cheap Talk 0.641 0.159 1768 0.153 0.360 
Longer Cheap Talk 1.941*** 0.004 1768 0.145 0.352 
Sorting Required -1.629*** 0.001 1768 0.420 0.494 
Polite -1.331*** 0.008 1768 0.137 0.344 
Landfill Visit 0.159 0.352 1740 0.556 0.497 
Landfill Distance -4.067*** 0.007 1238 10.562 7.798 
Landfill Distance Spline 3.946*** 0.008 1238 8.594 7.761 
Certainty -0.3722 0.180 1746 0.753 0.432 
CRP-H Household  2.756*** 0.000 1768 0.442 0.497 
Heteroscedasticity Variables      
Constant 2.906*** 0.000 1768 1.000 0.000 
(Opening) Bid 0.138 0.111 1768 2.847 1.028 
Notes:  ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.   The dependent 
variable is participation in a CRP.  The estimates for the constant term, as well as binary variables for “don’t know” 
and missing responses are not shown.   Overall sample size = 1768.  The varying number of observations (N) under 
the descriptive statistics reflects “don’t know” and missing responses.  The likelihood ratio statistic for the null 
hypothesis that all the coefficients on the explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero is LR = 336.61 and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2. Unconditional Participation Rates across Cheap-Talk Scripts  
 
 CRP-H Households CRP-A Households 
 No  
C-Talk 
Short 
C-Talk 
Long 
C-Talk N 
No  
C-Talk 
Short 
C-Talk 
Long 
C-Talk N 
COLA-
adjusted 
Opening  
Bids  
($/month) 
≤ 2 58.3 63.0 63.0 109 61.9 75.7** 82.3*** 195 
(2, 3] 64.0 64.9 77.5** 243 65.9 71.2 65.8 306 
(3, 4] 49.3 72.6*** 77.9*** 234 56.9 66.0 70.6** 298 
(4, 5] 61.8 55.7 65.4 233 39.8 59.6*** 60.3*** 328 
(5, 6] 60.0 52.2 62.4 222 44.9 51.6 55.6* 319 
(6, 7] 54.1 44.9 54.8 192 33.0 39.8 43.4* 272 
(7, 8] 39.1 38.2 36.8 213 24.4 32.4 41.7** 221 
(8, 9] 44.4 47.6 41.7 168 33.3 28.6 35.6 196 
(9, 10] 47.2 31.7 43.1 164 23.3 32.6 41.9** 132 
> 10 30.8 43.2 41.9 132 19.2 37.1* 30.0 91 
Totals    1910    2358 
Notes:  *, ** and *** indicate significantly different than No C-Talk at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance 
levels respectively.  Statistical tests for the differences in proportions are calculated as described in Freund 
(1992, p. 414-6).  CRP ≡ Curbside Recycling Program.  C-Talk ≡ Cheap Talk.  COLA ≡ Cost of Living 
Adjusted.   
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Table 3. Conditional Estimates of Cheap-Talk Scripts on Maximum WTP  
Interactive 
Terms 
Cheap-Talk Coefficients 
CRP-H Households CRP-A Households 
Short C-Talk Long C-Talk Short C-Talk Long C-Talk 
None 0.188 (0.256) 
0.584** 
(0.259) 
0.486** 
(0.227) 
0.794*** 
(0.223) 
Young 0.403 (0.437) 
0.647* 
(0.436) 
0.796** 
(0.433) 
1.037*** 
(0.419) 
Female -0.286 (0.342) 
0.272 
(0.337) 
0.582** 
(0.290) 
0.973*** 
(0.287) 
Env. Org. 0.674 (0.989) 
0.789 
(1.018) 
1.539** 
(0.754) 
1.454** 
(0.758) 
Bachelors 0.048 (0.459) 
0.751* 
(0.482) 
1.051* 
(0.748) 
-0.100 
(0.748) 
Ph.D. 0.485 (0.944) 
0.578 
(0.952) 
1.074* 
(0.799) 
1.383** 
(0.767) 
Sorting Required 0.237 (0.366) 
0.720** 
(0.372) 
0.323 
(0.363) 
0.819** 
(0.363) 
Ethical Duty 0.312 (0.285) 
0.579** 
(0.284) 
0.435** 
(0.238) 
0.825*** 
(0.235) 
Certainty ≥ 90 0.307 (0.316) 
0.712** 
(0.322) 
0.631** 
(0.277) 
0.935*** 
(0.270) 
Notes:  *, ** and *** indicate significantly different than No C-Talk at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance 
levels respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  CRP ≡ Curbside Recycling Program.  WTP ≡ 
Willingness To Pay.  C-Talk ≡ Cheap Talk.  Sample Size = 4253. 
 
